This paper studies the role of the credit crunch in the severe contraction of trade and economic activity at the height of the 2008-09 global …nancial crisis, using …rm-level data from six emerging market economies in Asia. We construct …rm-speci…c measures of global demand, which allow us to disentangle the e¤ect of falling demand from that of …nancial constraints on sales. The results indicate that: (1) Although the fall in demand adversely a¤ected the sales of all …rms during the crisis, sales declined by less for …rms with better pre-crisis …nancial conditions. (2) In the face of the decline in external …nancing opportunities, some …rms relied more on trade credit from suppliers to supplement operating capital during the crisis, which allowed them to post relatively better sales. (3) Export-intensive …rms with comparable …nancial vulnerability resorted less to trade credit as an alternative source of …nance, and hence experienced sharper declines in sales than the domestically-oriented …rms. These …ndings point to the presence of credit frictions among the factors that contributed to the disproportionately large decline in international trade during the crisis.
Introduction
The 2008-09 …nancial crisis had dramatic e¤ects on the global economic activity. One of the most salient features was the decline in international trade relative to gross domestic product (GDP), which was unusually abrupt compared with past recessions for most economies, including for the emerging market economies that we study in this paper ( Figure 1 ). 1 Several transmission channels may help explain this unprecedented drop in international trade, including the steep reduction in global demand, as well as the signi…cant tightening of external …nancing that reduced …rms' operating capital and limited their ability to satisfy demand for their products. The e¤ect of the decline in global demand on trade is well understood and documented. However, there has been relatively limited formal empirical analysis on the scarcity of external …nancing during the crisis as an additional factor that contributed to the collapse in trade and economic activity. 2 This paper …lls in this void by studying the e¤ect of the change in external …nancing more generally, and trade credit in particular, on trade and economic activity during the recent global …nancial crisis. 3 In our analysis, trade credit refers to the …nancing that …rms receive from their suppliers in the form of delayed payments for the transfer of goods and services. 4 Using …rm-level data from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand, we explore: (1) Whether …nancial constraints (i.e. reduced access to external …nancing in the form of bank loans and bond issuance) adversely a¤ected …rm-level sales during the crisis, after controlling for the deterioration in global demand. (2) Whether the ability of …rms to partially replace external …nance with trade credit from suppliers enhanced their relative performance during the crisis. (3) Whether the relative inability of export-intensive …rms to use trade credit as an alternative source of …nance contributed to the larger decline in sales experienced by these …rms.
To disentangle the e¤ect of …nancial constraints from the demand-driven reduction in sales during the crisis, we use two types of explanatory variables in our regression analysis. First, we use the variation in …rms'pre-crisis degree of …nancial vulnerability and reliance on various sources of …nance, including trade credit, to explain their sales performance during the crisis. Second, we construct …rm-speci…c measures of global demand, a novel approach that allows us to document the e¤ect of …nancial frictions on sales while controlling for the variation in demand.
Our results can be summarized as follows: (1) Financial conditions contributed to the decline in sales for all …rms, but sales declined by less for …rms with better …nancial conditions prior to the crisis, such as those with more liquid assets and less exposure to external …nance, especially short-term debt. Moreover, after controlling for pre-crisis …nancial characteristics, export-intensive …rms recorded larger declines in sales than their domestically-oriented counterparts. (2) Trade credit declined by less for the …nancially-vulnerable …rms, especially …rms with more exposure to short-term debt before the crisis, suggesting that some …rms relied more on trade credit to cope with the dire …nancial conditions during the crisis. In addition, …rms that were able to replace external …nance with trade credit during the crisis -predominantly domestic-oriented …rms -experienced smaller declines in sales than …rms that did not. Our results are not driven by di¤erences in demand for domestic and export-oriented …rms, or by di¤erences in the …rms'pre-crisis levels of inventories. We control for the e¤ect of demand on …rm-level sales in two ways: First, we implicitly control for demand by using industry, size and country …xed e¤ects, since …rms in the same industry and country of origin were likely to be a¤ected by similar demand conditions. Second, we use an index of global demand constructed from …rm-level data on export reliance, sector-level data on exports by destination, and real GDP growth across destinations as a proxy for the change in demand. We also control for the role of …rms'inventories in o¤setting the impact of …nancial constraints on sales. These results highlight the interaction between …nancial constraints and the real sector in propagating the e¤ects of the global …nancial crisis. In particular, they document the presence of …rm-speci…c credit constraints among the factors that led to the unprecedented drop in global trade during the crisis.
Our study adds to the sparse evidence on the role of trade credit and trade …nance during …nancial crises. For instance, Chor and Manova (2009) for the e¤ect of …nancial constraints on …rm-level sales and investment during crises. They highlight the existence of two sources of …nancial constraints, one arising from the decline in the supply of credit to …rms, and the other arising from the …rms'reliance on foreign-currency debt that reduced their net worth during depreciation episodes. Kolasa, Rubasek and Taglioni (2010) use Polish …rm-level data to show that foreign-owned …rms proved more resilient during the 2008-09 crisis, which they argue was due to intra-group lending mechanisms supporting the credit-constrained a¢ liates.
Finally, using data on French …rms, Bricongne et al. (2010) argue that export losses were larger for the more …nancially-constrained …rms; while large exporters were a¤ected mostly on their intensive margin, many small exporters stopped exporting altogether.
In contrast to the papers mentioned above, we study the role of trade credit received from suppliers (rather than trade …nance received from banks or foreign a¢ liates) measured at the …rm level (rather than at the sector level) as an alternative source of external …nancing during the 2008-09 crisis. In addition to trade credit, we also examine the relationship between …rms'…nancial vulnerability prior to the crisis (measured as the size of liquid assets and exposure to short-term debt) and their sales performance during the crisis, while also taking into account …rms'reliance on exports and exposure to global demand. Due to our focus on …rms from emerging Asia, the 2008-09 global …nancial crisis -which originated in advanced economies -can be viewed as an exogenous event in our analysis.
Our …nding that …nancially-vulnerable …rms (those with higher exposure to short-term debt before the crisis) substituted toward trade credit during the crisis is consistent with the literature on bank and trade credit channels. In an early study, Meltzer (1960) concludes that when liquidity conditions were tight, "…rms with relatively large cash balances increased the average length of time for which [trade] credit was extended. And this extension of trade credit appears to have favored those …rms against whom credit rationing is said to discriminate." More recently, Kohler, Britton and Yates (2000) use a panel of publicly-traded …rms from the United Kingdom and …nd that, during recessions, …rms with direct access to capital markets extended more trade credit and received less in return, thus making credit available to other …rms that rely more on bank credit. In line with Meltzer (1960) , they argue that there is a "trade credit channel" that o¤sets the traditional bank credit channel in the monetary economics literature. 5 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 describes the empirical speci…cations, and Section 4 discusses the …ndings and robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Data
Our empirical analysis uses annual and quarterly data for about 7,200 publicly traded non-…nancial …rms from six emerging Asian countries -China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand -obtained from the Worldscope database. About one quarter of the …rms in our sample with sales data for 2007 also reported exports for the same year (1,765 out of 7,227 …rms). 6 The …rm-level data display contours similar to those of the aggregate data ( Figure 2 for the countries in our sample. At the …rm level, we measure exports as the median sales of exportintensive …rms whose exports represent more than 50 percent of total sales (bottom-middle panel). The aggregate and …rm-level exports data display similar contours, with signi…cant declines at the height of the global …nancial crisis. Third, another notable feature of the crisis was the signi…cant 5 An important assumption behind the idea of the o¤setting trade credit channel is that the adverse …nancial shock must cause the external …nance premium to rise by more for bank-dependent …rms than for …rms with access to the capital market that provide trade credit. While a tightening of liquidity conditions may worsen …rms'access to bank credit, those …rms that can directly fund themselves in credit markets may step in to …ll the …nancing gap, thus reducing the e¤ect of the credit tightening on the economy. 6 The …rms reporting exports for 2007 account for similar shares (about 25 percent) of the cumulated total sales and total assets in our sample. A similar fraction of …rms reported exports on average between 2005 and 2007. Given our focus on international trade, we work with six emerging market economies where a reasonable number of …rms report both exports and sales for the pre-crisis year (2007) in the Worldscope database (see Appendix A). deterioration in credit provision and an attendant run-up in the cost of capital. This feature is captured in the panels to the right by the growth of credit extended to the private sector at the aggregate level (top), and by the median external …nancing at the …rm level (which is available at the annual frequency only, bottom panel).
The similarity in the patterns of aggregate and …rm-level data provides reassurance for the use of micro data to understand the linkages between …nancial conditions, trade and economic activity during the global …nancial crisis. The richness of the micro data allows us to conduct the analysis while controlling for other factors that otherwise would have confounded estimation.
Using these micro data, we construct a cross-sectional data set as follows. (See Appendix B for a detailed description of the variables.) The contraction in …rm-level activity during the …nancial crisis is measured by the percent decline in quarterly sales from peak (2008:Q3) to trough (2009:Q1). We construct the exports-to-sales ratio using data available at the annual frequency for 2007 (the pre-crisis year). For the baseline results, we treat …rms reporting sales but not exports as non-exporters; in our robustness analysis, we use two alternative measures of export reliance, with similar results. The pre-crisis measures of …nancial vulnerability and liquidity consist of short-term debt and working capital, each normalized by total assets, as well as the quick ratio (the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities).
Besides the standard forms of external and internal …nancing (measured as total external …nance and retained earnings, each normalized by total assets), …rms often rely on trade credit from suppliers to supplement operating capital. Thus, we use trade credit as one of the key variables in our study. We measure the stock of trade credit at the end of 2007 as the stock of accounts payable normalized by the cost of goods sold, following Love et al. (2007) and Levchenko et al. (2010) . 7 We use data for exports, short-term debt, quick ratio, working capital, external …nance and retained earnings available at the annual frequency only, and data on sales and accounts payable available at the quarterly frequency. Thus, the data allow to study the link between …rms' sales performance during the crisis measured at the quarterly frequency (as the percent change in sales between the peak and trough quarters) and a set of …rm characteristics measured with annual data for the pre-crisis year (including export reliance, …nancial vulnerability, liquidity and reliance on various sources of …nance in 2007). In an alternative speci…cation, the data also allow to study the link between …rms' access to trade credit during the crisis, measured as the change in Out of the initial 7,200 …rms, our econometric analysis is con…ned to the sub-sample of …rms for which data are simultaneously available for the dependent and explanatory variables (see Tables   1-3 ). The sample size is restricted by the removal of outliers, which we replace with missing values:
We exclude observations in both the top and bottom percentiles for external …nance (which can be either positive or negative), and remove the bottom percentile for retained earnings and working capital. For the exports-to-sales ratio, short-term debt, the quick ratio, and accounts payable (which have a lower bound at zero), we exclude observations in the top percentiles only. In addition to …rm-level data from Worldscope, we use annual data on exports by destination detailed at the two-digit sector level (provided by Comtrade), as well as quarterly data on real GDP for the countries of origin and destination to construct an index of global demand, as described in the next section.
Empirical Methodology
We study the behavior of …rm-level sales and trade credit received during the crisis in a crosssectional framework, with the peak-to-trough decline in sales and trade credit as dependent variables in alternative speci…cations. First, we aim to explain the sales performance during the crisis using the variation in …rm-speci…c …nancial characteristics measured prior to the crisis, such as the degree of …nancial vulnerability, liquidity, and reliance on external …nancing that became expensive and di¢ cult to obtain during the crisis. Second, we examine the characteristics of …rms that increased their use of trade credit as an alternative source of …nancing, and also investigate the e¤ect of this substitution on …rms' sales during the crisis. In both speci…cations, we control for the change in demand during the crisis.
Model 1: Determinants of Firm Performance
In the …rst model, we explore the link between …rm performance during the crisis, expressed as the percent change in …rm sales between 2008:Q3 and 2009:Q1 (the dependent variable), and …rm-speci…c characteristics such as …nancial vulnerability, reliance on external …nancing, export reliance measured before the crisis (year 2007), as well as exposure to demand conditions during the crisis.
This econometric speci…cation allows to measure the peak-to-trough change in sales using quarterly data, and at the same time to use explanatory variables computed from data available at the annual frequency only. Given that the downturn and subsequent recovery of economic activity in emerging market economies occurred over just a few quarters, the use of annual data to measure the peak-totrough decline in sales would have understated the e¤ect of the crisis on sales and the corresponding variation across …rms.
We use the following econometric speci…cation in a cross-sectional framework: 
where the set of explanatory variables includes:
1. Indicators re ‡ecting the degree of …nancial vulnerability and liquidity across …rms measured at the onset of the crisis (FinVuln 2007;i ). These are: (i) the stock of short-term debt normalized by total assets; (ii) in separate speci…cations, the quick ratio (the sum of cash, cash equivalents and net receivables divided by current liabilities) and working capital (the di¤erence between current assets and current liabilities normalized by total assets) as alternative measures of …nancial liquidity. 4. We use dummy variables to isolate the industry, size, and country e¤ects. We assign …rms to 24 industry groups provided by the Worldscope database, after excluding …nancial …rms from our sample. We also rank …rms in three size categories based on their total assets in 2007 (see Appendix B).
5. Indicators of demand. In one speci…cation, we implicitly control for demand through the industry, size and country …xed e¤ects, as discussed in the introduction. In an alternative speci…cation, we use a …rm-speci…c index of global demand, which we construct as described below.
Demand Index We construct the index of demand as a function of the …rms' exports-tosales ratio, the sector-speci…c exposure to various foreign destinations, and real GDP growth across destinations as a proxy for the change in demand. Since the …rm-level export data is not detailed by destination, we use sector-level data on exports by destination detailed at the 2-digit level for each country of origin (provided by Comtrade SITC rev.3) to approximate …rms' exposure to foreign destinations. 9 For each sector and country of origin, we compute the shares of 31 export destinations for 2007. On average, the 31 destinations comprised more than 90 percent of our countries'exports in 2007. 10 Thus, we assign the sector-speci…c external demand to …rms according to their primary sector of activity, country of origin, and …rm-speci…c degree of export reliance.
The demand index (DI isc ) for …rm i in sector s from country of origin c is a weighted average of the change in domestic and external demand between 2008:Q3 and 2009:Q1, with the weights given by the …rm-speci…c exports-to-sales ratio (Exp/Sales i ) in 2007:
In equation (2) 
Model 2: Substitution Across Sources of Finance
In the second model, we explore the …rms' ability to substitute across various sources of …nance during the crisis year (2008) as a strategy to relax their …nancial constraints and improve sales performance. To this end, we use the dynamic trade-o¤ between the change in trade credit and external …nancing received during the crisis as a new dimension of …rm heterogeneity, in addition to the static …nancial indicators measured prior to the crisis included in the speci…cation in equation (1), in order to explain the change in sales during the crisis. In Figure 3 , we classify …rms across the four quadrants de…ned by the zero lines. We label the quadrants as 1-4, starting with quadrant 1 in the North-West and moving clockwise towards quadrant 4 in the South-West:
1. Firms in quadrant 1 posted an increase in trade credit received from suppliers but negative external …nancing, thus replacing external …nance with trade credit during the crisis.
2. Firms in quadrant 2 experienced both an increase in trade credit and positive external …nanc-ing, thus becoming less constrained along both dimensions. In order to study the extent to which substitution between external …nance and trade credit a¤ected sales during the crisis, we add a set of dummy variables (Quad 1-3) to the speci…cation 1 1 In Figure 3 , we are constrained to using data on external …nance available at the annual frequency only.
described by equation (1) . The dummy variables re ‡ect the …rms'distribution across the …rst three quadrants in Figure 1 . 
On average, after controlling for …nancial characteristics, demand, industry, size and country, we expect …rms in quadrant 1 to outperform their counterparts in quadrant 4, since their improved access to trade credit should o¤set, at least partially, the reduced access to external …nance. We also expect …rms in quadrant 2 to outperform those in other quadrants. Finally, …rms in quadrant 3 should fare better than those in quadrant 4.
Model 3: Determinants of Trade Credit
In the third model, we study the behavior of trade credit that …rms received during the crisis. In 
Baseline Results
Model 1: Determinants of Firm Performance Table 1 shows the baseline results for speci…cation (1): In addition to the deterioration in global demand, the …rm-speci…c …nancial conditions prior to the crisis a¤ected sales performance during the crisis. Thus, …rms with greater …nancial liquidity ex-ante experienced a smaller drop in sales, as evidenced by the positive and signi…cant coe¢ cients on working capital in columns (1) and (3). Similarly, the results in columns (2) and (4), which use the quick ratio as an alternative measure of liquidity, also indicate that …rms with greater liquidity before the crisis experienced a relatively smaller decline in sales during the crisis. Di¤erences in the …rms'reliance on various sources of …nance also a¤ected sales: Firms with larger exposure to external …nancing prior to the crisis experienced a sharper drop in sales during the crisis, as shown by the corresponding coe¢ cients in all columns of Table 1 .
The coe¢ cient on the demand index (columns 3 and 4) is positive and statistically signi…cant,
showing that the decline in …rm-speci…c sales was in part associated with the fall in the global demand relevant to each …rm. It is notable, however, that even after controlling for the decline in global demand, the …rm-speci…c indicators of …nancial liquidity and reliance on external …nance prior to the crisis are statistically signi…cant and have the expected signs, as discussed above.
The results suggest that, in addition to demand, …nancial conditions contributed to the decline of …rm-level sales during the crisis.
Finally, while controlling for demand, exporting …rms experienced a relatively more severe deterioration in sales than domestically-oriented …rms. 12 This result is consistent with the outsized decline in trade relative to GDP observed for the aggregate data shown in Figure 1 .
Model 2: Substitution across Sources of Finance Although greater reliance on external …nance prior to the crisis disrupted sales, the …rms' ability to substitute external …nancing with trade credit during the crisis enhanced their sales performance. Table 2 shows the regression results for the speci…cation in equation (3), which includes the substitution quadrants. The coe¢ cient on quadrant 1 is positive and statistically signi…cant across all columns, suggesting that …rms that 1 2 Out of the 7,200 …rms with data on sales in our sample, about a quarter report either zero or positive exports for 2007; their median exports-to-sales ratio is 25 percent, and the average is 29 percent. For the baseline results, we assume that …rms reporting sales but not exports are non-exporters, and assign them an exports-to-sales ratio equal to zero. In the robustness analysis, we relax this assumption by exploring a couple of imputation methods to construct the export status of these …rms.
were able to increase trade credit experienced a smaller decline in sales (by about 6 to 7 percentage points less) relative to …rms in quadrant 4 (which experienced a reduction in both trade credit and external …nance during the crisis). The coe¢ cient on quadrant 3 is not statistically signi…cant -…rms with less trade credit but more external …nance did not fare better than …rms with less access to both sources of …nance -a result which highlights the importance of the trade credit dimension in understanding the sales performance across …rms. Thus, the ability to substitute away from external …nance towards trade credit enhanced sales, but the reverse was not true, possibly owing to the more onerous nature of external …nance at times of …nancial turmoil. Finally, as expected, …rms in quadrant 2 (which obtained more trade credit from suppliers and more external …nancing) experienced a smaller decline in sales relative to the …rms in quadrant 4 (by about 9 to 10 percentage points less).
The pre-crisis …nancial indicators are statistically signi…cant and have the expected sign, in line with our previous results. Firms that were less …nancially liquid (less working capital, smaller quick ratio) and more …nancially vulnerable prior to the crisis (greater reliance on short-term debt) performed worse than the average (columns 1-4). On the contrary, …rms with greater reliance on trade credit from suppliers before the crisis fared better (columns 1 and 2).
Interestingly, once we control for the substitution between external …nancing and trade credit, the coe¢ cient on the export-to-sales ratio becomes statistically insigni…cant (columns 1-4 in Table   2 ), suggesting that the relatively poor sales performance of export-oriented forms can be attributed to their lower ability to use trade credit. Indeed, out of the …rms in quadrants 1 and 2 (…rms that received more trade credit during the crisis), only 5 percent were export-intensive …rms (with exports representing at least half of total sales), compared to as much as 8 percent of …rms in quadrants 3 and 4. Table 3 shows the link between the change in trade credit and …rm-speci…c indicators of …nancial vulnerability and export reliance measured prior to the crisis.
First, the more …nancially-vulnerable …rms increased their use of trade credit during the crisis, as shown by the coe¢ cient on short-term debt, which is positive and statistically signi…cant in all columns. The result indicates that some of the …nancially-vulnerable …rms used more trade credit as an alternative form of …nance, likely due to the fact that their short-term debt matured and became di¢ cult to rollover during the crisis. One possible explanation for this result is that suppliers became willing to extend trade credit to …nancially-constrained …rms in order to maintain their customer base. Arguably, the close ties between suppliers and customer …rms facilitated this type of lending compared to bank lending, as explained earlier.
Second, the more export-oriented …rms were less able to use trade credit as an alternative source of …nance. In all columns of Table 3 , the results show a negative and statistically-signi…cant relationship between the export share of sales in 2007 and the peak-to-trough change in trade credit during the crisis. Notably, the pattern holds even after using the index of global demand in columns 3 and 4. This result is consistent with the uneven distribution of export-oriented …rms across the four quadrants in Figure 3 , as discussed above. The …nding suggests that export-intensive …rms experienced less access to trade credit as an alternative source of …nance, which in turn exacerbated the decline in international trade at the height of the …nancial crisis.
The headline results described above are subject to some caveats, which we address in the robustness analysis in the next section.
Robustness Analysis
Exports-to-sales ratio computed from logit model (Tables 4-6) In the analysis so far, we assumed that …rms reporting sales but not exports for 2007 were non-exporters, and thus we assigned a value of zero to their exports-to-sales ratio. There is a possibility that some exporters may fail to report exports data, in which case assigning zero values to their exports-to-sales ratio could be problematic.
To ensure that our results are not driven by this assumption, we re-estimate our speci…cations from Models 1 and 2 (see equations 1 and 3) with an alternative measure of export reliance, using the following approach. First, we estimate a logit model for the sub-set of …rms in our sample that reported either positive or zero exports for 2007. The dependent variable is the exporting status (exporter vs. non-exporter) and the predictor variable is the value of total assets in 2007 as a proxy for …rm size, following the well-established empirical result from previous studies that exporting …rms are larger and more productive than their domestically-oriented counterparts (Bernard et al., 2006) . We also use …xed e¤ects for industry and country of origin. The results from the logit speci…cation are presented in Table 4 . The slope coe¢ cient for total assets is positive and statistically signi…cant, showing that the probability of the …rm being an exporter increases with …rm size.
Second, we use the logit estimates to compute the probability of exporting as a function of …rm size for the …rms in our sample, including for …rms that did not report exports but reported total assets for 2007. 14 Third, we use the resulting export probabilities as a proxy for export status and re-estimate Models 1 and 2. We also re-compute the global demand index using the new proxy for the exportsto-sales ratio. The results, presented in Tables 5 and 6 , are largely similar to those in Tables 1 and   2 , con…rming that the assumption of zero exports for the missing observations does not materially a¤ect our baseline results: The coe¢ cients on pre-crisis indicators of …nancial liquidity are positive and statistically signi…cant, while those on external …nance (Table 5 ) and short-term debt (Table   6 ) are negative and signi…cant. In addition, in Table 6 , the coe¢ cients on quadrants 1 and 2 are positive and statistically signi…cant, showing that …rms substituting external …nance with trade credit during the crisis experienced a smaller decline in sales.
Constructing the export status for non-reporting …rms from the logit model has the advantage that it generates variation in the exports-to-sales ratio using a reasonable economic assumption (i.e. export status depends on …rms size). One possible limitation of this approach arises from the inability to determine the properties of the second-stage estimator, which depend on the extent to which the sub-sample of …rms reporting exports (used in the logit, …rst-stage estimation) is representative of the entire sample of …rms used in the second-stage regression. However, we do not believe that this limitation reverses our results. To be sure, we perform an additional robustness check by imputing the …rm-level export status from sector-level averages, with similar results (described below).
Exports-to-sales ratio from sector averages (Tables 7-9 ) On a country-by-country basis, we assign the average exports-to-sales ratio computed at the 2-digit sector level to the …rms in that sector that have missing export observations for 2007. We use the sector-level average ratios to replace the missing export observations at the …rm level only for sectors in which at least three …rms reported exports for each country. 15 We keep the original exports-to-sales ratio values for …rms that reported zero or positive exports.
The results for the determinants of sales performance, provided in Tables 7 and 8 , are similar to those in Tables 1 and 2 , and again show that the zero-export assumption for missing observations does not a¤ect our baseline results. Similarly, for the characteristics of …rms that used more trade credit during the crisis, the results in Table 9 are in line with the baseline results shown in Table 3 .
Inventories (Table 10 ) One potentially important variable missing from the headline analysis is the level of …rms' inventories. Inventories play an important role in meeting demand when production is disrupted. During the …nancial crisis, …rms with production constrained by the dire …nancial conditions could have drawn on inventories to ful…ll some or all of the demand for their products. In this case, …nancial conditions would have a smaller e¤ect on sales. We reestimate the speci…cation for Model 2 while controlling for the inventories-to-sales ratio measured in 2007. Indeed, the results in Table 10 show positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients on the inventories-to-sales ratio (columns 1 and 3): Firms with higher levels of inventories relative to sales prior to the crisis experienced a relatively smaller decline in sales during the crisis. In addition, the speci…cations in columns (2) and (4) interact the inventories-to-sales with the …nancial variables already discussed. The coe¢ cients on the interactions with the quick ratio and external …nance are statistically signi…cant and have the expected signs: The sales of …rms with higher pre-crisis levels of inventories relative to sales were less constrained by their liquidity position or reliance on external …nance. These results point to an important role of inventories in alleviating, but not eliminating, the e¤ect of …nancial constraints on performance, as our benchmark results indicate.
Sample composition (Table 11 ) The sample used to estimate the speci…cation in Model 2 (see Table 2 ) is larger than the sample used to estimate Model 3 (see Table 3 ) because accounts payable (the dependent variable in Model 3) are reported only by a subset of …rms. To insure that our results are not a¤ected by changes in the sample composition across the two models, we repeat the estimation of Model 2 while restricting the sample of …rms to the subset that report both sales and accounts payable at the quarterly frequency. The new results in Table 11 show that sample composition has little e¤ect on our main results. The coe¢ cients on the quadrant dummies are still positive and statistically signi…cant, and their magnitude is comparable to that from the baseline results in Table 2 . This …nding re-enforces our earlier results that …rms that accessed more trade credit when external …nancing became scarce performed relatively better during the crisis.
In addition, …rms with greater exposure to external …nance prior to the crisis fared worse, whereas those with more reliance on retained earnings or trade credit fared better.
Country e¤ect (Tables 12 and 13 ) Last, we assess whether the results of the study are driven by any particular country in the sample. To this end, we re-estimate column (2) of Table   1 and column (2) of Table 3 by excluding one country at a time from the sample. The results are presented in Tables 12 and 13 , respectively. For example, the speci…cation in column (1) excludes China; in column (2) we exclude India, etc. Overall the main results are little changed.
Conclusions
We explore the extent to which …nancial conditions contributed to the decline in …rms'sales at the height of the 2008-09 global …nancial crisis using micro data from six emerging market economies, while controlling for …rm-speci…c demand factors. We …nd that …nancial conditions adversely a¤ected sales during the crisis, and that the use of trade credit played an important role in the relative performance of …rms. In particular, when …nancing conditions deteriorated, the more …nancially-vulnerable …rms turned to trade credit from suppliers as a supplement to standard forms of …nancing. In addition, …rms that were able to replace external …nance with trade credit had better sales performance. In contrast to domestically-oriented …rms, export-intensive …rms with comparable …nancial vulnerability relied less on trade credit as an alternative source of …nance, and experienced sharper declines in sales. These results provide an explanation for the disproportionate decline in global trade during this recent crisis.
Our …ndings have implications for the design of policy to cushion the e¤ect of future …nancial crises. Policymakers and …rms would be well-advised to facilitate the development of trade credit as an additional source of …nancing when …nancial and credit markets become impaired. Along these lines, an interesting topic for future research would be to further understand the factors that determine the use or extension of trade credit between …rms and, in particular, whether there are impediments to the cross-border ‡ow of trade credit that prevent export-oriented …rms from using this form of …nancing to the same extent as their domestic-oriented counterparts.
A Exports Data by Country
We summarize the number of …rms reporting exports and sales for 2007 in the 
B De…nitions of Variables
Exports: Revenues generated from the shipment of merchandise to another country for sale.
External Finance: Company …nancing from outside sources. It includes the issuance and retirement of stock and debt.
Firm Size: We use total assets to construct dummy variables for …rm size. Firms with assets in the top 33 percent of the distribution are considered large; those in the bottom 33 percent are small; the remaining …rms are medium size.
Industry Group: We construct dummy variables at the two-digit level for the industry groups provided by Worldscope, described below. Retained Earnings: Accumulated after-tax earnings of the company that have not been distributed as dividends to shareholders or allocated to a reserve account.
Sales: Gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances. It includes franchise sales, consulting fees, service income, etc.
Short-Term Debt: Portion of debt payable within one year, including current portion of long term debt and sinking fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures.
Total Assets: Sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment, etc.
Total Current Liabilities: Debt or other obligations that the company expects to satisfy within one year. It includes accounts payable, short term debt, notes payable, current portion of long term debt, all accrued expenses, other current liabilities, income taxes payable, dividends payable, etc.
Working Capital: Di¤erence between total current assets and total current liabilities normalized by total current assets. 
where:
( The sample includes firms from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We rank firms into three categories by the size of their total assets measured in 2007. We use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. The sample includes firms from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We rank firms into three categories by the size of their total assets measured in 2007. We use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. The sample includes firms from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We rank firms into three categories by the size of their total assets. We use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. logit is the probability that firms were exporters in 2007. We first estimate a logit model of the relationship between exports and total assets for the sub-sample of firms that report exports in 2007 (Table 4) . We then use the logit estimates to compute the export probabilities as a function of total assets for the entire sample, including for firms that do not report exports for 2007, which is the explanatory variable in Table 5 .
Demand Index, logit is constructed as explained in the notes to Table 1 , except for that we now use Exports/Sales 2007, logit to compute the weights for domestic vs. international demand.
The sample includes firms from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We rank firms into three categories by the size of their total assets. We use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. The sample includes firms from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We rank firms into three categories by the size of their total assets measured in 2007. We use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. 2 -digit sector variable is equal to the firm-specific ratio for firms that report either zero or positive exports for 2007; it is equal to the sector average ratio for firms that report sales but not exports for 2007, as described in the text.
The Demand Index, 2-digit sector is constructed as explained in the notes to Table 1 , except for that we now use Exports/Sales 2007, 2-digit sector to compute the weights for domestic vs. international demand.
The sample includes firms from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We rank firms into three categories by the size of their total assets measured in 2007. We use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. The sample includes firms from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We rank firms into three categories by the size of their total assets measured in 2007. We use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. The sample includes firms from China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. We rank firms into three categories by the size of their total assets. We use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. Table 2 . Columns (2) and (4) add interactions of the inventory-to-sales ratio with each of the financial variables on rows 1-5. As in Table 2 , we use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. Table 2 while removing one country at a time from the sample (i.e. China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand). As in Table 2 , we use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. Table 3 while removing one country at a time from the sample (i.e. China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand). As in Table 3 , we use dummy variables to control for firm size, industry and country effects, but do not report their coefficient estimates. Note: "Emerging Asia-6" includes the six countries in our sample: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. "World" comprises of: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zeeland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
